Luftwaffle: A powerful air force

In February 1935 Hitler openly acknowledged the existence of the new German Luftwaffe (air force), in direct violation of the Treaty of Versailles that limited German military development. Under the direction of two former fighter ace comrades of the Red Baron, Ernst Udet and Hermann Goering, the Luftwaffe flourished into what could be considered the most technologically and tactically advanced air force in Europe.

In 1936 two well respected members of the Royal Air Force, Squadron Leader Herbert Rowley and Flight Lieutenant Dick Atcherley, made an unofficial visit to the German capital. Their report to the British Government was left unread and information discarded by the whole. Through intermediaries they were able to communicate with Winston Churchill, then a “back-seat” member of the parliament, and their information along with other RAF sources won him a seat on the prestigious Air Defense Research subcommittee.

During the thirties there were numerous intelligence committees and organizations dedicated to supplying valuable information regarding a possible war with Germany, although they were largely ignored by the political machinery of the nation. With Anglo-German relations in good shape during the mid thirties there was little reason to tarnish this tenuous fantasy, and not to be alarmed by the rapid buildup of the German Luftwaffe. Even the German involvement in the Spanish civil war was seen as forces of Western Christianity defending against the spread of nihilistic Bolshevism.

Rowley believed the anti-Bolshevism was a lip service policy of the Nazi propaganda machine, but returned from the trip realizing for the German populace at large it was “real and very intense”. They also were told by many Germans that 1914 was a great mistake and would never be repeated again. They were treated very cordially and were impressed by the German state. It is no surprise that Hitler in 1940 wished to make a peace with Britain believing they were “not natural enemies”.

The British in the inter-war period thought of aerial warfare much as we think of nuclear warfare today. During the 1930s it was already assumed that through a campaign of strategic bombing the Germans would seek to break the morale of the British people and bring about surrender. But by 1935 there were already doubts of the practical success of a strategic bombing campaign (this information being largely ignored during the war with the joint U.S./U.K. bombing of Germany).

Hugh Trenchard, a very influential guru of air power during the interwar period, taught that the key to future wars was the value of the bomber, in particular the strategic power of bombing. This was believed through most of the war and took significant trial to overcome. Many of the OKL (Luftwaffe High Command), on the other hand, believed that it was paramount to closely support and coordinate with the ground forces (close air support). In this they were correct and Britain would not see the errors in its ways until late in the war.